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Abstract 
 Nakagawa(2001) and Nakagawa(2002) applies a fair housing audit technique to 
age discrimination in Japanese rental housing market, using data from the 2001 
Osaka Audits. However, the experimental design of the study had some problems 
to be improved, e.g. lacked generality. This paper reports the outcome of a new 
fair housing audit (the 2002 Osaka Audits), in which improvements were added 
for these problems, and analyzes the existence of discrimination against the 
elderly as a whole and a variety of causes of age discrimination, using a broader 
range of tests of hypotheses.  
The results obtained can be summarized as follows: housing discrimination 
against elderly home-seekers was observed on a statistically significant level. It 
was also suggested that the risk of the elderly's future income changing, the risk 
of fire caused by their negligence, the risk of their tenancy period becoming too 
long, and their preference for location of housing, as well as young people’s 
preference for neighborhoods of young inhabitants, affected housing 
discrimination against elderly home-seekers.  Finally, it was found that the 
patterns of restrictions on renting houses to the elderly differed according to their 
family structure and age. 
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1. Introduction 
It is said that the elderly are given discriminatory treatment in the rental housing 
market in Japan, and the "Act for Stable Living of the Elderly" was passed in 2001 that 
contains many policies for improving elderly’s housing level, e.g. creating a rent 
guarantee system and improving the provision of information on housing available for 
elderly tenants.  Nakagawa (2001) and Nakagawa (2002) analyzed the situation of age 
discrimination using the audit study technique that has developed in the U.S. to detect 
racial discrimination.  More specifically, the author conducted in 2001 a fair housing 
audit in which the existence and causes of discrimination was tested by pairs of auditors, 
who had the same attributes except that one of the pair was an elderly auditor and the 
other was a young auditor, visit the same real estate agents alternately and by observing 
the agents' treatment of the auditors (hereinafter referred to as the 2001 Osaka Audits; 
see below).  The result of the study was that elderly home-seekers were provided with 
less information on housing units that were available than young home-seekers by about 
30%, and that the risk of the elderly's future income decreasing, the risk of their tenancy 
period becoming too long, and young people’s preference for neighborhoods of young 
inhabitants might have produced housing discrimination.  However, the experimental 
design of the study had some problems to be improved: Because the elderly auditors 
used were limited to single ones, and a relatively small range of data other than age 
were collected, so the study result did not have sufficient generality, and there were 
many hypotheses that could not be tested.  Moreover, because the elderly auditors were 
asked to answer their real ages, the test results might have reflected the trend for the 
elderly in their early sixties too strongly. 
This paper reports the outcome of a new fair housing audit (the 2002 Osaka Audits), in 
which improvements were added for the above-mentioned problems, and analyzes the 
existence of discrimination against the elderly as a whole and a variety of causes of age 
discrimination, using a broader range of tests of hypotheses. 
This paper also uses some econometric techniques in an attempt to specify the causes 
of age discrimination.  The U.S. has many precedent experimental studies using fair 
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housing audit data mainly on racial discrimination.  First, we can mention Yinger 
(1986) as a pioneering attempt that later became a standard for this category of studies.  
His paper used data of the 1981 Boston Audits, and tested linear model of the number of 
housing units that were available and inspected by each of the auditors.   
Then Roychoudhury et al. (1992) and Page (1995) improved the empirical method in 
consideration of the characteristics of fair housing audit data.  Ondlich et al. (1998) 
have a closer connection with the present paper.  To deal with the characteristics of 
respective real estate agents that are difficult to observe, such as their ability to provide 
information about available housing, they used Chamberlain (1980) fixed-effects logit 
technique. 
This paper uses the linear models adopted by Yinger (1986) to test the existence of age 
discrimination.  Then, using the fixed-effects logit techniques used by Ondlich et al. 
(1998), it tests hypotheses, and verifies results using the random-effects probit 
technique. 
The results obtained can be summarized as follows: housing discrimination against 
elderly home-seekers was observed on a statistically significant level.  It was also 
suggested that the risk of the elderly's future income changing, the risk of fire caused by 
their negligence, the risk of their tenancy period becoming too long, and their 
preference for location of housing, as well as young people’s preference for 
neighborhoods of young inhabitants, affected housing discrimination against elderly 
home-seekers.  Finally, it was found that the patterns of restrictions on renting houses 
to the elderly differed according to their family structure and age. 
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the data used and the 
estimation strategy.  Section 3 discusses whether age discrimination exists in the rental 
housing market in Japan.  Section 4 reports the hypotheses tested in relation to the 
causes of discrimination, Section 5, the result of estimation by the fixed-effects logit 
technique, and Section 6, the result of estimation by the random-effects probit technique.  
Section 7 is the conclusion. 
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2. Estimation Strategy 
2.1 Data (2002 Osaka Audits) 
The data used in this paper are from a fair housing audit the author conducted in the 
City of Osaka and the Hokusetsu area (e.g. Ibaraki, Takatuki, Toyonaka, Suita, Settsu, 
Minoo) in February and March 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 2002 Osaka Audits).  
Using this data, the following sections test hypotheses concerning the existence and 
causes of discrimination.  One of the features of the analyses in this paper, as 
compared to existing studies, is that it controls the attributes of housing units in more 
detail.  Controlling these attributes and the attributes given to the auditors, and 
analyzing the availability of units to them enable us to specify the causes of housing 
discrimination, which are based on unobservable differences in the attribute (e.g. risks 
on future income and too long tenancy period) that cannot be controlled even by the 
process of an audit study. 
This is the same as Nakagawa (2001) and Nakagawa (2002) using the 2001 Osaka 
Audits.  But, because the 2001 audits did not control the age of the elderly and only 
adopted elderly singles, the data produced by the audits lacked generality.  Moreover, 
the data collected were limited to a relatively small scope; for example, no data were 
gathered about the attributes of the staff in charge at the real estate agent and about the 
availability of elevators in the housing unit.  Therefore, the scope of hypotheses tested 
was limited, too.  In the 2002 Osaka Audits, the technique was expanded by giving 
auditors the attributes of income 1), family structure (singles or couples), and age (62, 70, 
77 years), considering the features of advertised housing units.  In addition, a broad 
range of data on real estate agents and housing units was collected.  The number of 
real estate agents studied was 197. 
 
2.2 Estimation Strategy for the existence of discrimination 
First, the existence of discrimination is described by the incidence of discrimination 
and is tested using a linear model about the number of units that are available. 
The simple net measure of the incidence of discrimination, which is obtained by 
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deducting the ratio of real estate agents giving unfavorable treatment to majorities from 
the ratio of agents giving unfavorable treatment to minorities, is adopted. 
The existence of discrimination regarding the number of units that are available is 
tested by the following linear model using the generalized least squares (GLS) 
procedure: 
i
a
i
a
i WQ λβα ++= 11    (1) 
where, i is the index of the real estate agent and a is that of auditor visits.  There are 
two types of visit: visit by an elderly home-seeker (a = 2) and visit by a young 
home-seeker (a = 1).  Also, 
a
iQ  : number of units that are available offered to visit a by real estate agent i; 
a
iW  : dummy variable that is 1 if visit a to real estate agent i is by an elderly auditor, 
and is 0 if such visit is by a young auditor; 
λi  : error component shared by the team mates, such as the characteristics of the real 
estate agent and the market environment. 
Because the constant term is the average number of units offered to young 
home-seekers and 1β  is the difference in the mean treatment of young home-seekers 
and elderly home-seekers, the sign of 1β  is expected to be negative if discrimination 
exists. 
 
2.3 Estimation Strategy for the causes of discrimination 
In the test of hypotheses for the causes of discrimination, both the fixed-effects logit 
technique and the random-effects probit technique are used to deal with the hetrogeneity  
of real estate agents. 
 
(1) Fixed-effects logit technique 
The fixed-effects logit technique used by Ondlich et al. (1998) is employed here, 
adding information about respective housing units to it.  First, the existence of 
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particular behavior of real estate agents is specified as follows: 
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where, j is the index of units to be audited, and it is assumed that these units belong to 
Group i; here i represents the real estate agent and j, the units the agent has in stock.  
As in Equation (1), a is the index of auditor visits. aijA  is a dummy variable that is 1 if 
the agent offers the unit to the visitor and is 0 in all other cases 2). aiW  is a dummy 
variable that is 1 if visit a to real estate agent i is by an elderly auditor and 0 if the visit 
is by a young auditor. aiX  is the vector of other explanatory variables concerning 
auditor visit a to real estate agent i.  For example, the variables are location of the 
office of real estate agent i and the sex and age of the staff in charge who receives the 
auditor. aijY  is the vector of explanatory variables concerning units j real estate agent i 
has in stock, which include such attributes of housing units as rent, age, and structure.  
X' and Y' are the variables in connection with discrimination. 
 To deal with unobservable characteristics of each auditor and real estate agent, 
hypotheses on age discrimination can be tested by evaluating Equation (3) below by the 
fixed-effects logit technique following Chamberlain (1980): 
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To measure the average level of discrimination by the constant term, this paper tests 
hypotheses using Equation (4) formulated by reformulating Equation (3): 
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where, X  and Y  are the averages of X and Y, and YXo ′′+′′+= 2222 γβδδ .  
)( 12 ii XX −  has a value other than 0 only if different individuals serve the auditors, 
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while )( 12 ijij YY −  is always 0, because it is assumed that the sum of the units offered to 
elderly home-seekers and those offered to young home-seekers is equal to the number 
of units the real estate agent has in stock. 
 
(2) Random-effects probit technique 
But, because the estimation by the fixed-effects logit technique can use the restricted 
data meeting the condition that 121 =+ ii AA , much information may become unusable 
because it belies this supposition.  Thus, this paper uses the random-effects probit 
technique, a binary choice model that is capable of dealing with heterogeneity between 
individuals.  More specifically, the following equation formulated by modifying 
Equation (2) is employed: 
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Equation (5) can measure the level of discrimination that average elderly home-seekers 
will experience using the coefficient of the dummy variable for the elderly. 
 
3. Existence of age discrimination 
Using the data from the 2002 Osaka Audits, this section describes the existence and 
level of age discrimination in the rental housing market.  First, Table 1 shows the 
simple net measure of incidence of discrimination.  Although the most blatant forms of 
housing discrimination, such as providing no information on the advertised units or 
similar units to the elderly, are relatively rare, the possibility that elderly home-seekers 
encounter real estate agents who would give them only a small amount of information is 
higher than that for young home-seekers by about 40%.  The probability that the 
elderly meet agents who would ask if they have a guarantor for renting a housing unit 
only to elderly home-seekers is higher by a similar ratio, too.  These trends are roughly 
the same as those observed in the 2001 Osaka Audits, indicating that although the Act 
for Stable Living of the Elderly (hereinafter referred to as the "SLE") was enforced in 
2001, no great changes have occurred yet as to the existence and level of age 
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discrimination. 3) 
 
 
(Table 1. inserts here) 
 
 
Next, the result of estimation of the number of units that are available by the GLS 
procedure is shown by Equation (6): 4) 
 
(Number of units available)ai = 4.6954 - 1.5533 (dummy variable for the elderly)i  (6) 
(0.2084***) (0.2371***) 
 
R2 = 0.711, number of samples: 394 
Note:  Figures with *** are significant on the 1% level. 
 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors, and both are significantly different from 
0 at the 1% level.  The sign of the dummy variable for the elderly is negative, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that there exists age discrimination.  According to the 
level of discrimination detected, young home-seekers were offered 4.70 housing units 
on average, but elderly home-seekers were offered only 3.14 units, fewer than those for 
young home-seekers by 1.55 units, which means there exists a difference of about 33% 
between the two age groups.  In the analysis of Nakagawa (2001) that used data from 
the 2001 Osaka Audits, a difference of 27% was observed, suggesting that there was no 
substantial change between 2001 and 2002 as to discrimination in the number of units 
that were available. 
 
4. The hypotheses tested 
The hypotheses about the causes of age discrimination are tested in the following 
sections.  First, this section explains the hypotheses used in the tests. 
 In Japan, there have been few reports on discrimination based on prejudice, such as 
agism. Also, the reasons that elderly home-seekers were unable to rent housing units, 
which were mentioned in a questionnaire sent to 117  property management companies 
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by the Japan Property Management Association ("Report of the Investigation on the 
Situation of Elderly Tenancy," April 2000; hereinafter referred to as the "ISET"; see 
Table 2) show that it is highly likely that age discrimination in rental housing market in 
Japan is statistical discrimination , i.e. discrimination based not on prejudice but on the 
physical and economical characteristics of elderly home-seekers.  Nakagawa (2001) 
and Nakagawa (2002) concluded that the hypothesis that the risk of the elderly's future 
income decreasing, the risk of their tenancy period becoming too long, and young 
people’s preference for neighborhoods with young inhabitants affect restrictions on 
renting houses to the elderly was supported by the data collected.  These hypotheses 
were proposed on the basis of the results obtained from the ISET.  But, because the 
2001 Osaka Audits was based on only one type of the elderly, i.e. elderly singles, they 
were unable to entirely test the motives listed in Table 2 and to fully control various 
factors affecting restrictions on renting houses.  Thus, this paper formulates six 
hypotheses for economically explaining age discrimination as to almost all of the 
motives in Table 2, that is, "community preference hypothesis," "disaster prevention 
hypothesis," "elderly preference hypothesis," "future income hypothesis," "tenancy 
period hypothesis," and "real estate agent hypothesis," and tests these hypotheses using 
the data from the 2002 Osaka Audits.  The explanatory variables used and their 
descriptions are shown in Table 3.  Each of the hypotheses is explained below. 
 
 
(Table 2. and Table 3. inserts here) 
 
 
(1) Community preference hypothesis 
The respondents of the ISET mentioned these two reasons for being negative about 
renting housing units to the elderly: "difficulty in taking action when an elderly tenant 
weakens or becomes ill" and "liability of the elderly to get into trouble with other 
tenants."  They are staff of property management companies, but their answers can be 
seen as reflecting the views of existing tenants and potential young tenants.  The 
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community preference hypothesis assumes that restrictions on renting houses to the 
elderly arise because elderly people residing in the neighborhood brings disutility to 
existing or potential young inhabitants due to the elderly's physical and life-style 
characteristics. 
The probability that results in such situations as the tenant's physical conditions 
worsened with no proper home-nursing provided and the tenant died is higher among 
single-member households and is expected to increase with aging.  Therefore, the 
coefficients of "singles," the variable representing single-member households, "the 
middle-stage elderly," the variable representing the elderly of 70 years, and "the 
late-stage elderly," the variable representing the elderly of 77 years, are expected to 
have a negative sign. 
It is also expected that landlords in the neighborhood having more young inhabitants 
will receive complaints and will lose tenants if they rent units to elderly home-seekers 5).  
Therefore, a positive sign is expected for the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units," the variable expressing the percentage of elderly inhabitants in 
the area where the housing unit is located.  At the same time, it is anticipated that 
restrictions on renting houses to the middle- and late-stage elderly, who have relatively 
high risks of changes in physical conditions, will reflect more elastically to this ratio. 
 
(2) Disaster prevention hypothesis 
This hypothesis is associated with the reason "safety and management problems of 
housing, including fires caused by negligence," mentioned ISET. If a fire broke out in 
their housing unit, the landlord and inhabitants of the neighborhood would lose their 
assets. 
This risk is higher if tenants are singles and are middle- or late-stage elderly people, 
and restrictions on renting houses will become greater accordingly. Moreover, 
considering initial fire-fighting activities by inhabitants in the neighborhood, an area 
with a higher ratio of elderly inhabitants will have a higher risk of the fire spreading to 
it. If such an area accepts new elderly tenants, who have a higher possibility of causing 
a fire by their negligence, it will result in the risk of heavier damage than in the areas 
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with lower ratios of the elderly.  Thus, there is a possibility that existing tenants or 
landlords in such an area have a motive to avoid raising the ratio of elderly in their 
neighborhood further. 
Therefore, this hypothesis predicts that the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units" will have a negative sign, and anticipates also that restrictions 
on renting houses to middle- and late-stage elderly home-seekers, who are more likely 
to cause fires by their negligence, will reflect more elastically to this ratio.  As noted, 
the community preference hypothesis and the disaster prevention hypothesis predict 
opposite signs as to the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of units." 
 
(3) Elderly preference hypothesis 
This hypothesis is related to the reason "limited availability of units with structure and 
equipment fit for the elderly" cited in the ISET.  It assumes that in anticipation of 
elderly home-seekers' preferences, the landlord refrains from offering them housing 
units that do not meet the expected preferences.  In this paper, the units for which the 
elderly have a preference are assumed to be those with large floor areas, on lower floors, 
equipped with elevators 6), and close to a station. 
 
(4) Future income hypothesis 
This hypothesis is associated with the reason "fear of rent arrears" mentioned in the 
ISET. Behind this fear are such facts as that elderly workers are more liable to be fired 
in a restructuring plan, that they have difficulty finding a new job once fired, and that 
they are apt to suffer from changes in physical conditions, which may make it difficult 
for them to pay rent regularly 7).  This hypothesis expects more blatant discrimination 
against singles and middle- and late-stage elderly people, and rental units with higher 
rents.  It is also expected that restrictions on renting houses to middle- and late-stage 
elderly people, for whom these risks are higher, will reflect more elastically to rents. 
 
(5) Tenancy period hypothesis 
This hypothesis is related to the reason "tendency of too long a tenancy period" 
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mentioned in the ISET. This motive is connected to the difficulty of raising rents for 
incumbent tenants under the Japanese Tenant Protection Law 8). 
If the landlord admits a tenant who stays for a long time, he or she has the risk of 
having to give up the possibility of increasing the rent in the future.  Because the 
landlord must abandon the chance to raise the rent for the maximum period of the 
remaining life of the rental housing unit, he or she will put greater restrictions on 
renting units with a longer remaining life at the time of renting.  In other words, these 
restrictions will be severer for housing with a structure having a longer remaining life, 
such as newly built units and steel and reinforced concrete composite construction (RC) 
units. 
Therefore, positive coefficients are anticipated for the "age of housing unit" and 
"non-RC units."  On the other hand, the longer remaining life expectancy elderly 
tenants have, the longer tenancy period they are expected to have.  Thus, it is expected 
that restrictions on renting housing because of these motives will be greater for 
early-stage elderly home-seekers, so these restrictions on middle-stage and late-stage 
elderly home-seekers will not reflect elastically to the "age of housing unit." 
 
(6) Real estate agent hypothesis 
This hypothesis holds that the more service years and the greater need for long-term 
relations with the landlord the staff of the real estate agent have, the more careful they 
would be in renting houses to minorities.  This paper adopts the age and sex 9) of the 
staff as explanatory variables. 
The hypothesis that real estate agents having offices in a neighborhood with elderly 
residents are more lenient to elderly home-seekers is also classified into this category. 
 
Table 4 shows the signs that each of the explanatory variables is likely to have for each 
of the six hypotheses.  If discrimination exists, all of the hypotheses are expected to 
have a negative sign as to constant terms in the fixed-effects logit model and as to the 
dummy variable "the elderly" used in the random-effects probit model. 
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(Table 4. inserts here) 
 
 
5. Estimation result obtained by the fixed-effects logit technique 
5.1 Estimation result of real estate agent data 
 
 
(Table 5. inserts here) 
 
 
First, the estimation result of Equation (4) using real estate agent data, i.e., the 
"number of units that are available" ( 1=aiA  if the number of units that are available to 
one auditor of a pair is larger than that for the other auditor at the real estate agent, and 
0=aiA  in all other cases) and "questions about guarantors" ( 1=aiA  if a question about 
a guarantor is asked at the real estate agent, and 0=aiA  in all other cases), is reported 
in Table 5.  The coefficients reported are those of the elderly auditor's explanatory 
variables in Equation (4) ( 2β ′ ) and those of the differentials between the auditors ( 2β ). 
10) 
As for the "number of units that are available," a constant term that is significant and 
has a negative sign is obtained, the case is very likely that the number of units offered to 
elderly home-seekers is less than that offered to young home-seekers.  Significant 
coefficients with a negative sign are also gained for the "late-stage elderly," "singles," 
and the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of units," which are all 
consistent with the "disaster prevention hypothesis."  Also, the negative coefficient of 
"male real estate agents" is consistent with the "real estate agent hypothesis." 
In "questions about guarantors," the constant term has a positive and significant 
coefficient. But note that an auditor was considered to be disfavored, if he, but not his 
teammate, was asked about his guarantors. So this variable should be evaluated by the 
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opposite sign to the sign actually obtained.  The positive and significant coefficients 
for the "middle-stage elderly" and the "late-stage elderly" suggest that home-seekers 
with a high risk of a change in physical conditions are asked to state that they have a 
guarantor, whereas the positive and significant coefficient for "rents" indicates that the 
higher the rent is, the more likely it is that the home-seekers are requested to affirm that 
they have a guarantor.  These results are both consistent with the "future income 
hypothesis."  The positive coefficient for "differentials of male real estate agents" is 
consistent with the "real estate agent hypothesis." 11) 
 
5.2 Estimation result of data for housing units offered 
 
 
(Table 6. inserts here) 
 
 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation result, using Equation (4), of the availability to 
home-seekers of rental housing units that real estate agents have in stock.  It is 
assumed that the total units offered to elderly and young home-seekers are all the units 
meeting the home-seekers' requests for housing attributes that agents have in stock. 
The constant term is estimated significant with a negative sign for rental units for 
singles, suggesting that elderly home-seekers on average tend to be provided with less  
information about units that are available.  In the case of units for couples, the constant 
term also has a negative sign, but is not significant.  The test result is outlined for each 
of the hypotheses below. 
First, the "community preference hypothesis" and the "disaster prevention hypothesis" 
are examined.  As stated above, these hypotheses anticipate opposite signs for the 
"ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of units" and the cross term of this ratio 
and the dummy variables for middle-stage and late-stage elderly people.  Regarding 
units for singles, negative and significant coefficients are elicited for the "late-stage 
elderly" and the cross term of the “middle-stage elderly” and the “ratio of elderly 
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inhabitants in the neighborhood of units."  As the "disaster prevention hypothesis" 
suggests, this result shows that the landlord's intention to avoid the ratio of elderly 
inhabitants from increasing.  But the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of units," the coefficient based on the early-stage elderly, has a positive sign, so the 
"disaster prevention hypothesis" was supported by the results of, or results consistent 
with this hypothesis are obtained for middle-stage and the late-stage elderly only. 
Regarding units for couples, no results that support the “disaster prevention  
hypothesis” are obtained.  Because that elderly singles are often unable to be as careful 
with fire as elderly couples, this result can be interpreted as being consistent, 
considering that the landlord will have a strong motive to avoid concentration of elderly 
singles, who are more risky than elderly couples.  Rather, the positive sign of the "ratio 
of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of units" and the cross term of the 
“middle-stage elderly” and the “ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of 
units" indicates, as does the result gained for early-stage elderly singles referred to 
above, the possibility that both elderly couple and early-stage elderly singles face 
discrimination in the same direction as the "community preference hypothesis." This 
will be confirmed later in the report on the test results using the random-effects probit 
technique. 
In addition, a negative and significant coefficient is estimated for units for singles as to 
"distance to the nearest station." This shows the tendency for convenient housing units 
near a station being offered more often to elderly home-seekers, which is consistent 
with the "elderly preference hypothesis." The positive and significant coefficients for 
"non-RC units" and the "age of housing unit" and the negative and significant 
coefficient for the cross term of "late-stage elderly" and the "age of housing unit" are 
consistent with the "tenancy period hypothesis." 
Finally, a negative and significant coefficient is obtained for units for couples as to 
"male real estate agents," which supports the "real estate agent hypothesis." 
 
The test results using the fixed-effects logit technique can be summarized as follows: 
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ⅰ The "number of units that are available" and "questions about guarantors," where the 
test was conducted using real estate agent data, both supported the "real estate agent 
hypothesis."  The former estimation also supported the "disaster prevention  
hypothesis," and the latter also supported the "future income hypothesis." 
ⅱ The test using data of units for singles that real estate agents has in stock supported 
the "elderly preference hypothesis" and the "tenancy period hypothesis."  As for 
the middle- and late-stage elderly, the "disaster prevention hypothesis" was 
supported, or the result consistent with this hypothesis was gained. 
ⅲ The test of units for couples supported the "real estate agent hypothesis." 
 
6. Estimation result using the random-effects probit technique 
The estimation using the fixed-effects logit technique reported in the preceding section 
used the data on condition that the sum of two observations is expressed by 
121 =+ ii AA , and the information on many housing units that did not satisfy this 
condition could not be used.  Of the data on 1,384 units that are available, only that of 
178 units for singles and of 116 units for couples were usable.  This section reports the 
estimation result using the random-effects probit technique, which can handle more 
samples than the fixed-effects logit technique. 
 
6.1 Estimation result of real estate agent data 
 
(Table 7. inserts here) 
 
 
 The estimation result for the "number of units that are available" and "questions about 
guarantors" is shown in Table 7.  As for the former estimation, the coefficient of the 
"elderly" is estimated to be negative and significant, suggesting that discrimination 
exists.  Also, as in the estimation result of Equation (4), significant negative 
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coefficients are estimated for "late-stage elderly," "singles," "male real estate agents," 
and "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of units."  A significant positive 
coefficient is obtained for "non-RC units," too.  The signs of these coefficients are all 
consistent with the "disaster prevention hypothesis," "tenancy period hypothesis," and 
"real estate agent hypothesis." 
As for "questions about guarantors," a significant positive coefficient is obtained for 
the "elderly," which indicates that there exists discrimination.  A positive and 
significant coefficient is estimated for "singles," too.  No significant results are 
obtained for the "middle-stage elderly," the "late-stage elderly," and "rents," but the 
coefficients of the first two variables have the same signs as the estimation result of 
Equation (4). 
 
6.2 Estimation result of data of housing units offered 
 
 
(Table 8. inserts here) 
 
 
The test result of rental units for singles and couples is shown in Table 8.  Regarding 
units for singles, the coefficient of the "elderly" has a negative sign, but is not 
significant.  As in the estimation result for Equation (4), the "late-stage elderly", 
"non-RC units," "distance to the nearest station," the "age of housing unit," and the 
cross term of the "middle-stage elderly" and the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units" are significant.  Because the "middle-stage elderly" and the 
cross term of the "late-stage elderly" and the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units" are also estimated to be significant and negative, the "elderly 
preference hypothesis" and "tenancy period hypothesis," as well as the "disaster 
prevention hypothesis" for the middle- and late-stage elderly, are supported robustly.  
No significant coefficient is obtained for the cross term of the "late-stage elderly" and 
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the "age of housing unit," but the sign is the same as that obtained for Equation (4). 
In the case of units for couples, the coefficient of the "elderly" is negative and 
significant, indicating that discrimination exists.  Also, as with the fixed-effects logit 
technique, a significant negative coefficient is obtained for "male real estate agents," 
which is consistent with the "real estate agent hypothesis."  The "tenancy period 
hypothesis" is not supported in the estimation using the fixed-effects logit technique, but 
the estimation using the random-effects probit technique produces a significant result 
that is consistent with this hypothesis as to "non-RC units" and the cross term of the 
"late-stage elderly" and the "age of housing unit".  A negative coefficient is also 
obtained for the cross term of the "late-stage elderly" and "rents," which is consistent 
with the "future income hypothesis."  In addition, a positive and significant coefficient 
of the cross term of the "late-stage elderly" and the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units" is obtained for elderly couples. Together with the positive sign 
of the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of units", is consistent with, or 
supports, the "community preference hypothesis." 
 
As noted, the following facts could be confirmed using the random-effects probit 
technique: 
ⅰ The "number of units that are available," real estate agent data, supported the 
"disaster prevention hypothesis," "tenancy period hypothesis," and "real estate agent 
hypothesis." 
ⅱ The data on housing units for singles supported, as with the fixed-effects logit model, 
the "elderly preference hypothesis" and "tenancy period hypothesis."  Similarly, the 
"disaster prevention hypothesis" was supported for the middle- and late-stage 
elderly. 
ⅲ The data on units for couples supported the "real estate agent hypothesis" as with the 
fixed-effects logit model, and the "tenancy period hypothesis," "community 
preference hypothesis," and "future income hypothesis" were also supported. 
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From the above result and the result attained in the test using the fixed-effects logit 
model, it can be summarized, especially as to the relation between neighborhood and 
age discrimination, that while the "disaster prevention hypothesis" was supported for the 
middle- and late-stage elderly singles, a result consistent with, or supporting, the 
"community preference hypothesis" was obtained for the early-stage elderly singles and 
elderly couples. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper tested the six hypotheses on the causes of age discrimination in the rental 
housing market, using the data from the 2002 Osaka Audits and by controlling the 
attributes of housing units in detail.  The fixed-effects logit technique and random- 
effects probit technique were adopted for this test.  Table 9 summarizes the sign 
conditions predicted  by each of the hypotheses and the signs of estimated significant 
coefficients.  The test result of the hypotheses can be summarized as follows: 
ⅰ  The result produced was that discrimination was practiced based on the 
characteristics of the elderly, i.e. liability to change in future income, and tendency 
toward too long a tenancy period("future income hypothesis" and "tenancy period 
hypothesis"). 
ⅱ  As for the "elderly preference hypothesis," which holds that real estate agents take 
into consideration elderly home-seekers' preferences when offering them 
information about units that are available, a significant result was attained 
regarding distance from the nearest station. 
ⅲ  It was concluded that male real estate agents are more likely to practice age 
discrimination, because they have a greater need to keep a good, long-term 
relationship with the landlord("real estate agent hypothesis"). 
ⅳ  It was found that, as for relations between the neighborhood and age discrimination, 
the pattern of discrimination differs according to family structure and age.  That is, 
a result consistent with, or supporting, the "disaster prevention hypothesis" was 
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produced for the middle- and late-stage elderly singles, whereas a result consistent 
with, or supporting, the "community preference hypothesis" was obtained for the 
early-stage elderly singles and elderly couples. 
 
 
(Table 9. inserts here) 
 
 
The results of the two audits, which are reported by this paper and by Nakagawa 
(2001) and Nakagawa (2002), explicitly show that age discrimination exists in the rental 
housing market and that a considerable part of housing discrimination against the 
elderly is statistical discrimination in tenant selection.  This test result that housing 
discrimination against the elderly can be explained by hypotheses about landlords’ 
reasonable tenant selection suggests that policy interventions should aim not at the 
prohibitive control of the age discrimination, but instead at selecting appropriate policy 
objectives and means based on evaluations of externalities or distribution problems.  
One of the problems to be dealt with is problems of distribution associated with higher 
search costs for the elderly people. Yinger (1997) offers useful information on assessing 
these additional costs, which is a precondition for policy interventions. 
The policies now introduced in Japan in relation to restrictions on renting houses to the 
elderly include (1) development of public housing units and other units for giving the 
elderly renting preference, (2) diffusion of information about housing that are available 
to the elderly, and (3) decrease in the risk of the elderly being in arrears with rent by the 
rent guarantee system. Encouraging the fixed term house lease system 12) is also an 
important policy theme. These policies will basically have the effect of solving 
problems of distribution associated with restrictions on renting houses to the elderly. 
But the test result of this paper, reasonable reasons such as risk related to the elderly's 
future income and their tenancy period, considerably affect age discrimination, 
indicated that the use of the fixed term house lease system and the policies described in 
(2) and (3) above will be especially effective.  In addition, as shown in Table 10, the 
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pattern of age discrimination differs according to the elderly’s family structure and age, 
which means the need for carefully designing the system.  Late-stage elderly singles 
face stronger restrictions on renting houses and thus have a greater need for distribution 
policies.  
 
 
(Table 10. inserts here) 
 
 
When designing housing policies for the elderly, careful consideration is also required 
for the relation between age discrimination and the neighborhood.  If traditional 
distribution policies are simply introduced, the concentration of the elderly in a 
neighborhood of elderly inhabitants might result.  Multidisciplinary approaches, in 
cooperation with the engineering approach, will be necessary for evaluating the 
externalities brought about by a concentration of elderly inhabitants. And the policies to 
be studied include distribution policies that would promote deconcentration, such as 
housing vouchers supplied only to those who move to a community with a low minority 
ratio, which were adopted for the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration, a policy 
experimented in the U.S. But discrimination against the middle- and late-stage elderly 
based on the risk of fires caused by negligence may not be much reduced even by these 
policies.  In such a case, the use of public housing units, in close cooperation with the 
welfare policy, will be effective. 
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Table 1. Incidence of discrimination measured by the 2001 Osaka Audits and 2002 
Osaka Audits 
 Simple net measure of incidence 
of discrimination (2002) 
Simple net measure of incidence 
of discrimination (2001) 
Availability of advertised units 1) 6.38% 8.77% 
Availability of similar units 2) 7.61% 6.09% 
No. of units available 3) 44.67% 37.39% 
Questions about guarantors 4) 43.15% 43.95% 
Questions about age 5) -0.51% 0.92% 
Questions about occupation 6) -6.60%  
Questions about income 7) 7.14%  
Requests for second contacts 8) 3.55% 5.31% 
 
Notes: 
1) Figures are those obtained by deducting the ratio of real estate agents who offered advertised units 
to elderly auditors only from that of agents who offered such units to young auditors only. 
2) The same as 1). 
3) Figures are those obtained by deducting the ratio of real estate agents who offered more units to 
elderly auditors from that of agents who offered more units to young auditors. 
4) Figures are those obtained by deducting the ratio of real estate agents who asked questions about 
guarantors to young auditors only from that of agents who asked such questions to elderly 
auditors only. 
5) to 7) The same as 4). 
8) Figures are those obtained by deducting the ratio of real estate agents who requested a second 
contact to elderly auditors only from that of agents who made such request to young auditors 
only. 
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Table 2. Reasons that elderly home-seekers were unable to rent housing units 
Reason No. of real estate agents concerned
Difficulty in taking action when an elderly tenant weakens or becomes ill 93 
The landlord's wish to avoid elderly tenants 81 
Safety and management problems, including the risk of fires caused by negligence 68 
No guarantors 56 
Limited availability of units with structure and equipment fit for the elderly 44 
Fear of rent arrears 28 
Rents unacceptable to elderly home-seekers 16 
Tendency of too long a tenancy period 10 
Liability of the elderly to get into trouble with other tenants  4 
Carelessness with rules  1 
 
Source: "Report of the Investigation on the Situation of Elderly Tenancy," the Japan Property 
Management Association, 2001 
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Table 3. Explanatory variables used 
Variable Description 
The elderly Dummy variable is 1 if the auditor is an elderly one and 0 if the auditor is a 
young one. 1) 
Singles Dummy variable is 1 if the auditor is a single and 0 if the auditor is one 
member of a couple. 
The middle-stage elderly Dummy variable is 1 if the elderly auditor is 70 years and 0 in all other 
cases. 
The late-stage elderly Dummy variable is 1 if the elderly auditor is 77 years and 0 in all other 
cases. 
Male real estate agents Dummy variable is 1 if the staff at the real estate agent who dealt with the 
auditor was a male and 0 in all other cases. 
Young real estate agents Dummy variable is 1 if the staff at the real estate agent who dealt with the 
auditor was considered to be 40 years or less and 0 in all other cases. 
Rents Rents of housing units (including common service fees) 
No. of tatami No. of tatami of housing units 
Non-RC units Dummy variable is 1 if the unit is wooden or of steel-frame construction 
and 0 if it is of steel and reinforced concrete composite construction (RC). 
Distance to the nearest 
station 
Distance on foot from the unit to the nearest station 
Floor number of unit Floor number where the unit exists 
Elevators Dummy variable is 1 if the unit has elevators and 0 if it has no elevators 2)
Ratio of elderly inhabitants 
in the neighborhood of real 
estate agents 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the ward or municipality where the real 
estate agent has its office 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants 
in the neighborhood of 
units 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the cho or chome (small administrative 
divisions of a city) where the unit is located 
Differentials of male real 
estate agents 
Differentials of “Male real estate agents” between elderly and young 
home-seekers  
Differentials of young real 
estate agents 
Differentials of “Young real estate agents” between elderly and young 
home-seekers  
Wards and municipalities Dummy variable concerning the ward or municipality where the unit is 
located 
Notes: 
1) The variable "elderly" is used in Tables 7 and 8. 
2) It is assumed that housing units with five floors or more had elevators even if it was not known 
during the audits whether they had elevators. 
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Table 4. Signs of coefficients expected by the six hypotheses 
 Community 
preference
Disaster 
prevention 
Elderly 
preference
Future 
income 
Tenancy 
period 
Real 
estate 
agent
Singles ‹ 0 ‹ 0  ‹ 0   
The middle-stage elderly ‹ 0 ‹ 0  ‹ 0 › 0  
The late-stage elderly ‹ 0 ‹ 0  ‹ 0 › 0  
Male real estate agents      ‹ 0 
Young real estate agents      › 0 
Rents    ‹ 0   
No. of tatami   › 0    
Non-RC units     › 0  
Distance to the nearest station   ‹ 0    
Age of housing unit     › 0  
Floor number of unit   ‹ 0    
Elevators   › 0    
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of real estate agents 
     › 0 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units 
› 0 ‹ 0     
The middle-stage elderly * rents    ‹ 0   
The late-stage elderly * rents    ‹ 0   
The middle-stage elderly * age of housing 
unit 
    ‹ 0  
The late-stage elderly * age of housing 
unit 
    ‹ 0  
The middle-stage elderly * ratio of elderly 
inhabitants in the neighborhood of units 
› 0 ‹ 0     
The late-stage elderly * ratio of elderly 
inhabitants in the neighborhood of units 
› 0 ‹ 0     
The elderly or constant term ‹ 0 ‹ 0 ‹ 0 ‹ 0 ‹ 0 ‹ 0 
Differentials of male real estate agents      ‹ 0 
Differentials of young real estate agents      › 0 
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Table 5. Estimation result of real estate agent data by the fixed-effects logit 
technique 
No. of units available Questions about guarantors 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
The middle-stage elderly 0.0636 0.43935 4.5530**  2.2504 
The late-stage elderly -1.1103* 0.6370 5.2790*  2.9188 
Singles -1.3994* 0.7699 6.5262  5.7224 
Male real estate agents -1.4548** 0.7038   
Young real estate agents -0.1845 0.7664 0.5545  5.8062 
Rents -0.2686 0.2225 4.5063*  2.3070 
No. of tatami -0.0363 0.0679 -0.9793*  0.5365 
Non-RC units 0.5398 0.5140 -2.8374  2.9287 
Distance to the nearest station -0.0382 0.0557 0.6025  0.3721 
Age of housing unit 0.0258 0.0293 0.3545  0.2531 
Floor number -0.0502 0.1389 0.3367  0.5392 
Elevators 0.3258 0.5350 -15.8138* 9.5780 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of real estate agents 
4.3587 10.2548 373.5952** 166.9091 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of units 
-9.3661* 5.5380 -24.5465 22.1910 
Differentials of male real state agents 1.1944* 0.7241 24.5556***  5.2068 
Differentials of young real estate agents 0.9583 0.6058 10.0106*  5.9136 
Constant term   -1.4130*** 0.2488 15.0287**  6.2908 
     
No. of data 142  91  
χ2 25.66  35.96  
 
Note: Figures with *, **, or *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Estimation result of data for all units offered by the fixed-effects logit 
technique 
Rental units for singles Rental units for couples 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
The middle-stage elderly -1.0738 0.7234 2.3335  2.1179 
The late-stage elderly -2.4908*** 0.7970 4.8186**  2.1404 
Male real estate agents -0.2018 0.9864 -8.4755***  3.0228 
Young real estate agents -0.2178 0.7400 4.0985 10.4355 
Rents 0.1224 0.4132 -0.8211  0.9759 
No. of tatami 0.1215 0.0754 -0.2348  0.1588 
Non-RC units  1.4366** 0.5722 0.5568  0.8649 
Distance to the nearest station -0.1491** 0.0725 -0.1207  0.0970 
Age of housing unit  0.1163** 0.0581 -0.0383  0.1331 
Floor number -0.0692 0.1368 0.3008  0.3144 
Elevators 0.8228 0.5741 -0.0463  1.0472 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of 
real estate agents 
-25.7850 25.7159 -98.5582 68.8461 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood of 
units 
5.5523 7.6038 27.2149 40.0643 
The middle-stage elderly * rents 0.1712 0.5234 1.2449 0.9095 
The late-stage elderly * rents 0.1283 0.4392 0.6508  1.0894 
The middle-stage elderly * age of housing unit 0.0805 0.0885 0.1272  0.1597 
The late-stage elderly * age of housing unit -0.1329* 0.0712 -0.0101  0.1671 
The middle-stage elderly * ratio of elderly inhabitants 
in the neighborhood of units 
-30.1607** 12.5783 20.5163 41.3727 
The late-stage elderly * ratio of elderly inhabitants in 
the neighborhood of units 
-10.7418 9.7672 -0.8697 44.8130 
Differentials of male real estate agents -1.1154 0.8036 4.8308*  2.6858 
Differentials of young real estate agents -0.8745 0.9655 0.9681  1.3639 
Constant term 
 
  -0.9986** 0.4354 -1.5459  1.0443 
No. of data 178  116  
χ2 52.67  73.73  
Notes: 
1) Figures with *, **, or *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
2) In addition to the variables listed above, a dummy variable for wards and municipalities was used. 
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Table 7. Estimation result of real estate agent data using the random-effects probit 
technique 
No. of units available Questions about guarantors 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
The elderly -1.1490*** 0.1753 1.5191*** 0.2523 
The middle-stage elderly -0.1399 0.2668 0.3173 0.2918 
The late-stage elderly -0.6644** 0.3228 0.3087 0.3073 
Singles -1.0733** 0.5206 1.2029* 0.6254 
Male real estate agents -0.9719** 0.4396 0.1574 0.5541 
Young real estate agents 0.1414 0.4409 -0.4665 0.5217 
Rents -0.1817 0.1560 -0.0800 0.1814 
No. of tatami -0.0365 0.0456 0.0745 0.0522 
Non-RC units 0.6305* 0.3802 0.6280 0.4298 
Distance to the nearest station -0.0478 0.4081 -0.0195 0.0451 
Age of housing unit 0.0297 0.0219 0.0299 0.0267 
Floor number 0.0281 0.0913 0.0558 0.1000 
Elevators 0.3414 0.3825 -0.2002 0.4230 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of real estate agents 
0.0850 7.3684 9.3508 8.6889 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of units 
-7.5745** 3.7137 -3.6248 3.8323 
Constant term -1.9674 1.2521 -0.5381 1.8275 
     
No. of data 342  342  
waldχ2 82.33  46.89  
 
Note: Figures with *, **, or *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Estimation result of data of all the units offered using the random effect 
probit technique 
Rental units for singles Rental units for couples  
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
The elderly -0.1689 0.1430 -1.0419*** 0.2028 
The middle-stage elderly -0.5861** 0.2497 0.1554 0.3107 
The late-stage elderly -0.4797** 0.2261 0.3286 0.3411 
Male real estate agents -0.3551 0.4077 -2.2090*** 0.5286 
Young real estate agents 0.0908 0.3534 -0.3534 0.5343 
Rents 0.0244 0.2035 0.0499 0.1960 
No. of tatami 0.0327 0.0394 -0.0436 0.0491 
Non-RC units 0.5755** 0.2844 0.6856* 0.4135 
Distance to the nearest station -0.0659* 0.0356 -0.0612 0.0410 
Age of housing unit 0.0545** 0.0272 0.0206 0.0352 
Floor number -0.0237 0.0721 -0.0086 0.0805 
Elevators 0.3518 0.3214 0.0786 0.4137 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of real estate agents 
-10.9176 11.4800 -25.8862 17.8443 
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of units 
2.2095 3.7309 9.0525 5.9827 
The middle-stage elderly * rents -0.1285 0.2049 0.2524 0.1821 
The late-stage elderly * rents -0.0780 0.1684 -0.4457** 0.2203 
The middle-stage elderly * age of housing unit -0.0169 0.0313 0.0406 0.0392 
The late-stage elderly * age of housing unit -0.0364 0.0272 -0.0772* 0.0406 
The middle-stage elderly * ratio of elderly 
inhabitants in the neighborhood of units 
-11.6924** 4.8908 -0.5071 6.0871 
The late-stage elderly * ratio of elderly 
inhabitants in the neighborhood of units 
-7.8324** 3.9004 15.7213* 8.2082 
Constant term 1.5062 1.6469 -4.1817 2.9926 
 
No. of data 
 
612 
 
 
 
449 
 
 
waldχ2 177.11  281.94  
Notes: 
1)  Figures with *, **, or *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
2) In addition to the variables listed above, a dummy variable for wards and municipalities was used. 
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Table 9. Signs of coefficients expected by the six hypotheses and the signs of estimated significant coefficients 
 CH DH EH FH TH RH LN LQ LS LC PN PQ PS PC 
Singles - -  -   -    - -   
The middle-stage elderly - -  - +   -     -  
The late-stage elderly - -  - +  - - - + -  -  
Male real estate agents      - -   - -   - 
Young real estate agents      +         
Rents    -    -       
No. of tatami        +       
Non-RC units     +    +  +  + + 
Distance to the nearest station   -      -    -  
Age of housing unit     +    +    +  
Floor number of unit   -            
Elevators   +     +       
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of real estate agents
     +  -       
Ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units 
+ -     -    -    
The middle-stage elderly * rents    -           
The late-stage elderly * rents    -          - 
The middle-stage elderly * age of 
housing unit 
    -          
The late-stage elderly * age of 
housing unit 
    -    -     - 
The middle-stage elderly * ratio 
of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units 
+ -       -    -  
The late-stage elderly * ratio of 
elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units 
+ -           - + 
The elderly or constant term - - - - - - - - -  - -  - 
Differentials of male real 
estate agents 
     - + -  +     
Differentials of young real 
estate agents 
     +  -       
1) CH is the community preference hypothesis, DH is the disaster prevention  hypothesis, EH is the elderly preference hypothesis, 
FH is future income hypothesis, TH is the tenancy period hypothesis, and RH is the real estate agent hypothesis. 
2) LN, LQ, LS, and LC are the estimation results for data on the number of units that are available, questions about guarantors, units 
availability for singles, and units availability for couples, respectively, using the fixed-effects logit technique. 
3) PN, PQ, PS, and PC are the estimation results for data on the number of units that are available, questions about guarantors, units 
availability for singles, and units availability for couples, respectively, using the random-effects probit technique. 
4) The estimation results reported in this table are those only for coefficients estimated to be significant at a 10% level. 
5) Because questions about guarantors are negative, the signs shown here are the opposite to the signs actually obtained. 
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Table 10. Incidence of discrimination by family structure and age 
 Units for singles Units for couples Total 
The early-stage elderly 12.45% 24.12% 17.18% 
The middle-stage elderly 25.64% 18.57% 22.57% 
The late-stage elderly 31.51% 16.00% 24.62% 
Total 22.94% 19.33%  
 
Note: Figures are those obtained by deducting the ratio of units that are only available to elderly 
home-seekers of all the units real estate agents had in stock from that of units that are only 
available to young home-seekers only to all the units. 
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Notes: 
1. There are two checking stages of the tenants in the Japanese rental housing market. The first stage 
is checking by real estate agents, and the second stage is checking by landlords themselves. 
Although income was established for each audit, no questions about income were asked by real 
estate agents in almost all of the audits at the checking stage by real estate agents.  Therefore, 
none of the established income is used in the test of hypotheses reported in the following 
sections. 
2. Where the estimation is concerned with the number of units that are available and whether 
particular questions were asked or not, for each real estate agent, the explained variable is Aia, 
and Yija is excluded from the explanatory variable.   
3. No comparison between the two fair housing audits is possible for "questions about occupation" 
and "questions about income" because the audits' data collection method differed. 
4. The result of R2 reported here is that obtained by the ordinary least squares (OLS)  using a 
dummy variable for real estate agents. 
5. Moreover, the landlords in a community of young inhabitants are not very experienced in the 
management of elderly tenants, and so may be unable to take proper action if these tenants suffer 
from any changes in physical condition. 
6. The author tried to obtain information on barrier-free houses (houses with specifications and 
facilities devised for the elderly), but was unable to obtain the information for almost all the 
houses surveyed. 
7. The design of the 2002 Osaka Audits was based on the premise that the young auditors were 
public employees working at Osaka University and the elderly auditors were pensioners. If the 
rent of the unit was very high, the elderly auditor was assumed to own a rental unit in another 
area and have a stable income in addition to his pension.  Thus, the risk of dismissal was 
excluded, and the design adopted only the risk of increasing expenses due to changes in physical 
condition. 
8. The Japanese Tenant Protection Law prohibits a landlord from ejecting a tenant from the house, 
except in special cases, such as if the tenant fails to pay rent.  Also, if the tenant refuses a rent 
rise, the landlord cannot increase the rent unless he or she obtains permission from a court. 
9. According to the "Report of the Basic Statistical Survey on Wage Structure 2001" (Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare), the ratio of workers who continued to work for 15 years or more at 
a firm with 10-99 employees was 27% for males and 17% for females. 
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10. The data on advertised units are used here.  Because the number of samples is limited, the 
dummy variable for wards and municipalities, and the cross terms of the age of elderly 
home-seekers and "rents," "age of housing unit," and "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the 
neighborhood of units," which are used in the estimations shown in Tables 6 and 8 below, are not 
used in the estimation shown in Tables 5 and 7. 
11. Significant coefficients were estimated for the "ratio of elderly inhabitants in the neighborhood 
of real estate agents" and "differentials of young real estate agents," too, but their relations with 
the hypotheses are not very clear. 
12. In 2000, the fixed term house lease system, under which a house lease contract expires after a 
certain period, was created. 
 
